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It  is  no  secret  that  U.S.  agricultural  institutions,  from 
commodity groups to their political supporters in Con-
gress, have lost much of their enthusiasm for trade agree-
ments. The discussions in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Doha Round have staggered on for nearly eight 
years and the political deal that would open up access in 
emerging markets in exchange for restraints on developed 
country subsidies has yet to be struck. With new admin-
istrations in India and the United States still considering 
their priorities, trade experts are cautioning that it may be 
well into 2010 before an agreement can be reached. And 
the prospects of a major concession on access to markets 
for agricultural goods by countries such as India and Brazil 
remain remote. So, given that trade deals are typically sold 
to agriculture as tools to expand exports, the lack of enthu-
siasm for trade agreements is understandable.
The prospect is no more encouraging with respect to 
regional and bilateral trade agreements, which have grown 
dramatically  (World Trade  Organization,  2009a).  These 
have included some improved market access for U.S. ag-
ricultural products, but have mainly involved small trade 
partners. Often the temporary advantage of better market 
access is lost as other exporting countries negotiate their 
own bilaterals in the same markets. And defensive interests, 
particularly in import sensitive products such as sugar and 
dairy products, have often dominated the U.S. negotiating 
strategy and have led to a less ambitious outcome. One 
may expect that only if agreements were negotiated with 
some big markets such as the European Union (EU), Ja-
pan, or China would the level of interest rise, but given 
recent experience there is little evidence that even major 
bilateral agreements would generate much excitement. The 
Korea-U.S.  Free Trade  Agreement,  which  does  promise 
considerable export potential to a large and growing mar-
ket, and no threat of new imports, has stimulated no real 
pressure for implementation by Congress and has no real 
support in the administration. Movement toward other bi-
lateral agreements is similarly sluggish.
Despite their current lack of fashion, there are three ma-
jor reasons why U.S. agriculture should vigorously support 
trade talks to guide the shape and direction of the world 
trade system for agricultural and food products. First, trade 
and trade institutions are changing and these changes are 
important. Second, trade agreements are needed to ensure 
that foreign regulations that affect food and agricultural 
markets are not slanted against U.S. producers. Third, re-
vised multilateral trade institutions are needed to monitor 
and possibly address links between agricultural trade and 
climate change regulations. 
A New World of Institutions
The existing institutions that govern world trade, as well 
as finance and monetary relationships, were constructed at 
the end of the 1940s by the United States and its European 
allies. Developing countries were incorporated into this 
system slowly over the years but not fully integrated into 
the agenda-setting function of these institutions until the 
current round. Developing countries were allowed to opt 
out of many trade obligations but given their small role in 
global trade had no place at the head of the table. The turn-
around in this relationship has been dramatic. Now coun-
tries such as India, China and Brazil, along with the United 
States, the EU and Japan, have a major role in managing 
the trade system.  As their influence grows along with their 
aggregate incomes, these emerging economies will increas-
ingly drive the governance of agricultural markets.  Will 
they favor a continuation of the liberalization envisaged (if 
not fully implemented) in the Uruguay Round? Or will 
they favor protected national markets with a more supple-
mental role for trade? Obviously the export sectors of U.S. 
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Broadly, negotiations in the Doha 
Round currently revolve around this 
issue  (World  Trade  Organization, 
2009b). What outcome would allow 
WTO members to meet their special 
trade concerns while avoiding any sig-
nificant weakening of the objective of 
trade liberalization? A deal on the ba-
sis of the “modalities”—or negotiat-
ing framework—not-quite-agreed to 
last July would give emerging econo-
mies  and  others  considerable  scope 
for keeping the ability to protect their 
farm  sectors  against  imports,  both 
through lower tariff cuts and through 
a new safeguard mechanism. Is this a 
deal that should be embraced by U.S. 
agriculture? It is certainly a less ambi-
tious outcome than had been sought 
in the U.S. negotiating position ar-
ticulated by the prior administration. 
But would half a loaf be better than 
no  bread?  And,  is  this  “half-loaf” 
even attainable? The answers from the 
view of exporters depends on wheth-
er one thinks that a whole loaf may 
be offered at a later date. This seems 
doubtful.  More  likely  is  a  situation 
where  other  exporters  negotiate  bi-
lateral trade deals with the emerging 
economies, leaving the United States 
to be one of the “least-favored” na-
tions. And if the developing countries 
decide on a more protectionist model 
for  their  own  agricultural  develop-
ment,  the  opportunity  to  negotiate 
sweeping tariff reductions in agricul-
tural products may not reappear for 
decades.
So  the  appropriate  long  run 
strategy for U.S. agricultural export-
ers may be to accept that something 
close to the current “modalities” is the 
best deal available while focusing on 
getting a strong commitment to con-
tinue the liberalization process. To be 
effective, continuation should involve 
ongoing talks rather than the occa-
sional  big  “round”  of  negotiations 
that is becoming unwieldy. As a part 
of a broadly palatable deal, exporters 
should agree to constrain their ability 
to ration exports in times of scarcity. 
The New World of Markets
While  major  new  trade  agreements 
have been stuck in neutral, markets 
for  agricultural  and  food  products 
have been moving away from trade 
in raw materials and commodities, to 
an interconnected network of suppli-
ers providing products to consumers 
through  a  concentrated  marketing 
sector.  This  trade  is  dominated  by 
large firms that manage a portfolio of 
suppliers in order to be less vulnerable 
to weather-related supply disruption, 
though it is still subject to income, 
food safety and other shocks. Trade 
rules  that  affect  these  markets  tend 
to be regulations of health and safety, 
quality  and  consumer  information. 
The regulations in turn tend to frag-
ment the market, as producers must 
decide  which  market  or  markets  to 
target. Wide differences in consumer 
tastes  and  sensibilities  offer  on  the 
one hand the chance of higher prices 
from  careful  differentiation  of  the 
product and on the other the higher 
costs of catering to separate markets. 
U.S. exporters face these opportuni-
ties and dilemmas daily.
The  content  of  food  regulations 
is  a  significant  factor  in  determin-
ing competitive suppliers. Countries 
choose which regulations to demand 
of their suppliers. And markets of the 
size of the United States and the EU 
influence standards for much of the 
rest of the world. At present this regu-
latory web is evolving in two different 
ways. First, the EU and the United 
States are using provisions in bilateral 
agreements to encourage acceptance 
by their trading partners of their own 
health  and  safety  standards  and  of 
their own labeling and other regula-
tions  on  matters  such  as  the  treat-
ment of biotech products. National 
markets  tend  to  follow  either  the 
EU’s regulations that emphasize “cau-
tion” in matters of safety, or standards 
such as those in the United States that 
take a more conventionally “science-
based” approach to defining goods on 
the basis of their safety and allowing 
the private sector to handle the provi-
sion of information to consumers.
The  second  market  evolution  is 
the rapid spread of private standards. 
This  is  a  natural  outcome  of  the 
spread of global supply chains, where 
retailers need to know that all sup-
pliers follow particular practices, and 
also a reaction to the market value of 
being able to present the consumer 
with  particular  attributes  (organic, 
fair-trade, hormone-free, etc.). So on 
the  one  hand  the  private  standards 
relieve the authorities from the need 
to  design  public  standards  on  such 
attributes, but on the other they can 
come close to usurping the role of the 
public  authorities  to  monitor  trade 
to protect plant, animal and human 
health. The issue of the sale of bio-
tech foods in Europe was complicated 
when the supermarkets, with the help 
of the media, chose to make GM-free 
food a marketing tool. At that stage 
it became unclear whether the trade 
flows were restricted by lack of com-
mercial demand or impediments to 
market access. 
U.S. agriculture has a major stake 
in how these issues are resolved. The 
push should be for an agreement be-
tween the United States and the EU 
on a set of standards for other coun-
tries to meet for sales to these two 
markets. The recent compromise on 
the  beef-hormone  issue  shows  that 
such  bilateral  solutions  can  resolve 
long-standing  disputes.  A  resolu-
tion to the controversy over biotech 
labeling regulations would help U.S. 
farmers  to  sell  products  in  markets 
currently adhering to more restrictive 
EU rules. A resolution to long-stand-
ing disagreements on the labeling of 
foods by region of origin is also over-
due: the discussions on this question 
in Geneva have gone nowhere on this 
issue in five years.  A full-scale EU-
U.S.  free  trade  agreement  may  not 
be possible, or desirable, but a com-
prehensive  agreement  on  standards 
in food and other areas could be con-
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negotiate a role in reducing fossil fuel 
use that is less like a political favor 
and more like a constructive contri-
bution to the solution to an ongoing 
problem.
The  second  aspect  to  this  prob-
lem is more directly related to trade. 
The climate bill that passed the U.S. 
House of Representatives has provi-
sions for import tariffs on countries 
that  do  not  have  equivalent  GHG 
reduction  systems.  Climate  policies 
in other countries are also likely to 
include such provisions. U.S. exports 
of farm products will become vulner-
able to new barriers and tariffs if the 
United  States  has  excluded  agricul-
ture from emissions limits. One can 
imagine  a  situation  where  trade  in 
farm goods is divided between those 
countries that have strict GHG emis-
sion  rules  for  agriculture  and  those 
that don’t. And since reduction tar-
gets may only be met by addressing 
farm emissions, other countries will 
not be happy to see the United States 
giving agriculture a free pass.
Both of these aspects of climate 
change policy argue for the full par-
ticipation of agricultural interests in 
the development of sensible rules at 
an international level for dealing both 
with agriculture as a potential source 
of emission reduction and with agri-
cultural trade tensions when practices 
differ  by  country.  U.S.  agriculture 
should be taking the lead in formu-
lating trade rules that prevent an out-
break  of  climate-change  protection-
ism.
Conclusion
It has become clear over the past two 
decades  that  domestic  policy  issues 
must be seen in an international con-
text. Trade talks are often frustrating 
and sometimes seem to impose un-
expected  restraints  on  domestic  ac-
tion, as illustrated by the U.S.-cotton 
case in the WTO. But such talks are 
necessary to build, bit-by-bit, a trade 
system that benefits efficient export-
ers  and  removes  the  scope  for  pro-
tectionist policies in other countries. 
The Doha Round offers the chance 
to once-and-for-all remove the pos-
sibility of dumping farm products on 
world markets with export subsidies. 
It potentially can level the scope for 
giving trade-distorting domestic sup-
port. And it would reduce tariffs in 
developed countries by one half. It is 
likely to be less successful in reducing 
developing-country  tariffs  for  farm 
goods. But calling a halt to the Round 
would not help in this regard. Indeed 
it could set back such efforts by years.
As important for U.S. agriculture 
are other aspects of trade, particularly 
that of health and safety regulations 
along  with  private  standards.  Frag-
mentation of the global market is not 
desirable, either for the United States 
or for other countries. Here, U.S. ag-
riculture could take the lead in sup-
porting  the  development  of  global 
approaches to issues that are currently 
problems to exporters. These include 
the increased use of agreed interna-
tional standards for health and safety, 
the resolution of differences over bio-
tech  labeling  and  certification,  and 
the rules on the use of regional iden-
tification for particular foodstuffs.
And  the  specter  of  a  swarm  of 
complex  legislation  from  trading 
partners on the role of agriculture in 
GHG  emission  reduction  suggests 
that early discussions on how to avoid 
trade wars will be needed. Obviously 
it would be better to be able to shape 
the  agenda  for  such  talks.  An  agri-
cultural establishment in the United 
States  that  is  too  inward  looking 
could be caught unawares by issues 
that  will  determine  their  ability  to 
sell into global markets. This would 
seem to be an issue on which some 
preemptive action may pay dividends 
later. But it requires an imaginative 
approach to the link between agricul-
ture and climate change to be able to 
address these questions, and a willing-
ness to engage trade partners in con-
structive conversation on the possible 
solutions.
The New World of Climate 
Change Policy
Governments  around  the  world  are 
implementing  schemes  to  cap  and 
reverse emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) and hence make use of ener-
gy sources and other activities that are 
major emitters more expensive. Cor-
respondingly, energy sources that can 
be shown to emit less GHG will be-
come more attractive. Agriculture is a 
major user of energy, a major source 
of GHG emissions, a provider of bio-
mass for alternative energy and a ma-
jor “sink” for the sequestration of car-
bon to the benefit of curbing global 
warming. The rapid expansion of bio-
fuel facilities at a time when oil prices 
soared raised the visibility of such a 
use for corn and the impact that this 
had  in  food  markets.  This  link  be-
tween oil prices and agricultural pric-
es is a new phenomenon that could 
have significant implications for the 
stability of agricultural markets in the 
future.  So  how  agriculture  fits  into 
national programs of energy use and 
green-house gas emissions will influ-
ence whether the sector as a whole is 
taxed or subsidized by climate change 
regulations. Trade issues arise because 
producers will be aware of the side-
benefits of these regulations to com-
peting producers. 
U.S.  agricultural  and  forestry 
groups  have  two  primary  interests 
in this matter. One is whether they 
will be required to participate fully in 
the effort to reduce GHG emissions. 
At present the answer in the case of 
the United States appears to be that 
the sector will be given a limited role 
as  a  provider  of  “offsets”  that  can 
be purchased by other industries to 
cover their own emissions (U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, 2009). But 
whether this is a stable long-run so-
lution is questionable: some may ask 
whether such favorable treatment is 
not in itself a subsidy. At the least it 
may  influence  the  political  viability 
of traditional farm subsidies. So U.S. 
agriculture  may  be  better  served  to 4  POLICY ISSUES    PI6 – October 2009 
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